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Table of Contents

On Adjoint and Brain Functors

David Ellerman, University of California at Riverside, Philosophy Department

Social Groups Prioritize Selective Attention to Faces: How Social Identity Shapes Distractor Interference

Gewnhi Park, Inje University
Jay J Van Bavel, New York University (NYU) - Department of Psychology
LaBarron K. Hill, Duke University
DeWayne P. Williams, Ohio State University (OSU)
Julian Thayer, Ohio State University (OSU)

Are Artworks More Like People than Artifacts? Individual Concepts and Their Extensions

George E. Newman, Yale School of Management
Daniel M. Bartels, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Rosanna K. Smith, Yale University, School of Management, Students

Better P-Curves

Uri Simonsohn, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
Joseph P. Simmons, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
Leif D. Nelson, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business


PHILOSOPHY OF MIND eJOURNAL

"On Adjoint and Brain Functors" Free Download
Axiomathes (preprint), Forthcoming

DAVID ELLERMAN, University of California at Riverside, Philosophy Department
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There is some consensus among orthodox category theorists that the concept of adjoint functors is the most important concept contributed to mathematics by category theory. We give a heterodox treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms (object-to-object morphisms between objects of different categories) that parses an adjunction into two separate parts (left and right representations of heteromorphisms). Then these separate parts can be recombined in a new way to define a cognate concept, the brain functor, to abstractly model the functions of perception and action of a brain. The treatment uses relatively simple category theory and is focused on the interpretation and application of the mathematical concepts. The Mathematical Appendix is of general interest to category theorists as it is a defense of the use of heteromorphisms as a natural and necessary part of category theory.

"Social Groups Prioritize Selective Attention to Faces: How Social Identity Shapes Distractor Interference" Free Download

GEWNHI PARK, Inje University
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JAY J VAN BAVEL, New York University (NYU) - Department of Psychology
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LABARRON K. HILL, Duke University
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DEWAYNE P. WILLIAMS, Ohio State University (OSU)
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JULIAN THAYER, Ohio State University (OSU)
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Extensive research suggests that faces might inevitably capture visual attention. In two experiments, we examined how social groups guide selective attention toward in-group and out-group faces. Black and White participants detected a target letter among letter strings superimposed on faces (Experiment 1). White participants were less accurate on trials with out-group (Black) compared to in-group (White) distractor faces. Likewise, Black participants were less accurate on trials with out-group (White) compared to in-group (Black) distractor faces. However, this pattern of out-group bias was only evident under high perceptual load — when the task was visually difficult. To examine the malleability of this pattern of racial bias, participants were assigned to mixed-race minimal groups (Experiment 2). Participants assigned to groups were less accurate on trials with their minimal in-group members compared to minimal out-group distractor faces under high load, regardless of race. The current research suggests that social identity guides selective attention toward motivationally relevant social groups — shifting from out-group bias in the domain of race to in-group bias in the domain of minimal groups — when perceptual resources are scarce.

"Are Artworks More Like People than Artifacts? Individual Concepts and Their Extensions" Free Download
Topics in Cognitive Science, 6, 647-662, 2014

GEORGE E. NEWMAN, Yale School of Management
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DANIEL M. BARTELS, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
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ROSANNA K. SMITH, Yale University, School of Management, Students

This paper examines people's reasoning about identity continuity (i.e., how people decide that a particular object is the same object over time) and its relation to previous research on how people value one-of-a-kind artifacts, such as artwork. We propose that judgments about the continuity of artworks are related to judgments about the continuity of individual persons because art objects are seen as physical extensions of their creators. We report a reanalysis of previous data and the results of two new empirical studies that test this hypothesis. The first study demonstrates that the mere categorization of an object as 'art' versus 'a tool' changes people's intuitions about the persistence of those objects over time. In a second study, we examine some conditions that may lead artworks to be thought of as different from other artifacts. These observations inform both current understanding of what makes some objects one-of-a-kind as well as broader questions regarding the nature of people's intuitive theories for tracking the persistence of human agents.

"Better P-Curves" Free Download
Simonsohn, Uri, Joseph P. Simmons, and Leif D. Nelson, “Better P-Curves,? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Forthcoming

URI SIMONSOHN, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
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JOSEPH P. SIMMONS, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
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LEIF D. NELSON, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business
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When studies examine true effects, they generate right-skewed p-curves, distributions of statistically significant results with more low (.01s) than high (.04s) p-values. What else can cause a right-skewed p-curve? First, we consider the possibility that researchers report only the smallest significant p-value (as conjectured by Ulrich & Miller, 2015), concluding that it is a very uncommon problem. We then consider more common problems, including (1) p-curvers selecting the wrong p-values, (2) fake data, (3) honest errors, and (4) ambitiously p-hacked (beyond p<.05) results. We evaluate the impact of these common problems on the validity of p-curve analysis, and provide practical solutions that substantially increase its robustness.

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Advisory Board

Philosophy of Mind eJournal

JULIA ELIZABETH ANNAS
Regents Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona

DAVID CHALMERS
Professor of Philosophy, ARC Federation Fellow, Director - Center for Consciousness, Australian National University

MAUDEMARIE CLARK
Carleton Professor of Philosophy, Colgate University

CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD
Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

ALAN SIMMONS
Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Virginia

ELLIOTT R. SOBER
Hans Reichenbach Professor of Philosophy and William F. Vilas Research Professor, University of Wisconsin

ERNEST SOSA
Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University

BRIAN WEATHERSON
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University