The Center for Law, Society, and Culture (http://www.law.indiana.edu/centers/lawsociety/) is sponsored by the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The Center actively supports and promotes multidisciplinary understanding of law and legal problems through scholarship, teaching, and discussion. The Center is located in the School of Law on the Bloomington campus of Indiana University, but produces, presents and coordinates research conducted by more than 70 scholars from schools and departments across Indiana University. The Center's affiliated scholars hold appointments in African-American studies, business, criminal justice, journalism, history, economics, English, law, and gender studies, among others, and are dedicated to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the role of law in society and culture. The Center supports research related to the law in a broad sense, including the cultural aspects of law expressed through political theory and scientific aspects of law expressed through technological advances in biotechnology, environmental science and information technology.
LAW & SOCIETY: PUBLIC LAW - CRIME, CRIMINAL LAW, & PUNISHMENT eJOURNAL
Sponsored by: Indiana University Maurer School of Law
"'I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He'd Lost Control': The Impact of PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5"
Utah Law Review, Forthcoming
NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, New York Law School
The adoption by the American Psychiatric Association of DSM-5 significantly changes (and in material ways, expands) the definition of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a change that raises multiple questions that need to be considered carefully by lawyers, mental health professionals, advocates and policy makers.
My thesis is that the expansion of the PTSD criteria in DSM-5 has the potential to make significant changes in legal practice in all aspects of criminal procedure, but none more so than in criminal sentencing. I believe that if courts treat DSM 5 with the same deference with which they have treated earlier versions of that Manual, it will force them to seriously confront - in a wide variety of cases - the impact of PTSD on sentencing decisions. And this may lead to more robust debates over the impact of mental disability generally on sentencing outcomes.
My optimism here is tempered by (1) the reality that courts deal teleologically with mental disability evidence in general (subordinating it when it is introduced by the defendant, and privileging it when introduced by the state), and (2) the power of sanism - an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry - in this entire inquiry.
On the other hand, we must also consider the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on the question in hand. Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Although some scholars have considered TJ in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it remains mostly an â€œunder the radarâ€? topic. I believe it is essential we give it a new and urgent focus.
I am convinced that, if courts take seriously the new treatment of PTSD in DSM 5, and couple that with an understanding of sanism and an application of TJ, that will lead to an important sea change in the ways that defendants with that condition - especially those who are Iraqi and Afghanistani war veterans - are sentenced. This paper proceeds in this manner. First, I briefly review the law of sentencing as it relates to persons with disabilities, focusing on developments that followed the Supreme Courtâ€™s decision in United States v. Booker (making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory) , the role of sanism, and the significance of therapeutic jurisprudence. Then, I look at how courts have, until this moment, treated PTSD in sentencing decisions. I will then look at DSM 5 to highlight its definitional changes. I then try to â€œconnect the dotsâ€? to show how DSM 5 demands changes in sentencing practices, and explain how this change can be consonant with the principles of TJ. I will end with some modest conclusions.
"Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Rule of Law"
Engage, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2015, Forthcoming
RONALD A. CASS, Center for the Rule of Law, Cass & Associates, PC, Boston University School of Law
Recently, both practical and doctrinal changes have significantly reduced the degree to which criminal punishment fits rule-of-law ideals. Although far from the only cause, the expansion of criminal sanctions as a by-product of an extraordinary explosion in administrative rulemaking that is backed by criminal liability has helped propel this change. While there are reasons to support criminal enforcement of administrative decision-making, the ways in which administrative rules are adopted, applied, and enforced and the scale of governmental law-making (including administrative rule-making) that has provided the grounds for potential criminal penalties have produced a massive increase in government power that risks serious erosion of individual liberty. This change cries out for immediate attention â€• and for changes to the law. This article explores differences between criminal law and administrative law, and between statutory and administrative rule generation and application, explaining how differences between administrative law and criminal law play out (problematically) with respect to much criminal enforcement of administrative rules.
"Kent Make-Up Their Minds: Juveniles, Mental Illness, and the Need for Continued Implementation of Therapeutic Justice within the Juvenile Justice and Criminal Justice Systems"
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, p. 149, 2013
CARMEN M. CUSACK, Nova Southeastern University
This article discusses issues and promising solutions to the inundation of minors with mental illness into the juvenile justice (JJ) and criminal justice (CJ) systems. Minors, who have fewer rights than adults, require therapeutic justice to treat mental illness. In Section II, I analyze the precedence set by Kent v. U.S. for procedural due process in juvenile cases. In subsections A and B, I discuss how courts have applied Kent to issues that involved juvenile competency and consent for treatment. Many juveniles have been traumatized by abuse and other environmental factors. These children are not hardened criminals. The system should attempt to make them whole before castigating them as adults or deciding to waive them into criminal court. Section III discusses the role that trauma plays in recidivism and entanglements with the JJ and CJ systems. Section IV discusses criminalization of mental illness, as it relates to biological and environmental factors, and the justice systems. Therapeutic justice is essential for rehabilitating youth and adults who enter the system and require treatment. In Section V, I explain why therapeutic jurisprudence is about problem solving rather than punishment, with the primary goal of social justice. Section VI discusses mental health court and other programs for mentally ill juveniles in need of therapeutic justice. Section VII offers a new vision for the justice systemâ€™s treatment of mentally ill delinquents and offenders. This section suggests that society needs to continue shifting the roles of members of the court to a therapeutic position. It also suggests that we need to continue humanely building our response to mentally ill offenders at both the community and political levels.
"A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career Criminal Act Debacle"
113 Michigan Law Review 151 (2014)
AVI M. KUPFER, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - University of Michigan Law School
For thirty years, the Armed Career Criminal Act (â€œACCAâ€?) has imposed a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on those people convicted as felons in possession of a firearm or ammunition who have three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Debate about the law has existed mainly within a larger discussion on the normative value of mandatory minimums. Assuming that the ACCA endures, however, administering it will continue to be a challenge. The approach that courts use to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicate offenses creates ex ante uncertainty and the potential for intercourt disparities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's guidance on sentencing ACCA defendants has been unclear. The resulting ambiguity creates inequity between defendants and fails to give them fair warning of the statute's scope. This ambiguity also depletes the resources of courts, defendants, and prosecutors and prevents the statute from realizing its full potential of deterring violent crime. This Note argues that rather than allowing this debacle to continue, Congress should delegate to a federal agency the task of compiling a binding list of state statutes that qualify as predicate offenses. Under this approach, the states would assist the federal agency by providing initial guidance on their ambiguous statutes. The U.S. Sentencing Commission has the manpower, subject familiarity, and institutional incentives to build and maintain the appendix, and state sentencing commissions would make ideal partners. In states that do not have sentencing commissions, comparable agencies and even properly incentivized attorneys general may be able to aid the federal Sentencing Commission. Congress should leverage this undertaking to resolve related definitional questions about the meaning of a violent crime in other areas of federal law.
"Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislators"
Brookings Institution: The Robots Are Coming: The Project on Civilian Robotics, November 2014
GREGORY S. MCNEAL, Pepperdine University School of Law, Pepperdine University - School of Public Policy
The looming prospect of expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones, has raised understandable concerns for lawmakers.1 Those concerns have led some to call for legislation mandating that nearly all uses of drones be prohibited unless the government has first obtained a warrant. Privacy advocates have mounted a lobbying campaign that has succeeded in convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating the use of drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen states requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone. The campaigns mounted by privacy advocates oftentimes make a compelling case about the threat of pervasive surveillance, but the legislation is rarely tailored in such a way to prevent the harm that advocates fear. In fact, in every state where legislation was passed, the new laws are focused on the technology (drones) not the harm (pervasive surveillance). In many cases, this technology-centric approach creates perverse results, allowing the use of extremely sophisticated pervasive surveillance technologies from manned aircraft, while disallowing benign uses of drones for mundane tasks like accident and crime scene documentation, or monitoring of industrial pollution and other environmental harms. Legislators should reject a warrant-based, technology-centric approach as it is unworkable and counterproductive. Instead, legislators should follow a property rights-centric approach, coupled with limits on persistent surveillance, data retention procedures, transparency and accountability measures and a recognition of the possibility that technology may make unmanned aerial surveillance more protective of privacy than manned surveillance.
This paper makes five core recommendations: 1. Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial surveillance. This approach provides landowners with the right to exclude aircraft, persons, and other objects from a column of airspace extending from the surface of their land up to 350 feet above ground level. Such an approach may solve most public and private harms associated with drones. 2. Legislators should craft simple, duration-based surveillance legislation that will limit the aggregate amount of time the government may surveil a specific individual. Such legislation can address the potential harm of persistent surveillance, a harm that is capable of being committed by manned and unmanned aircraft. 3. Legislators should adopt data retention procedures that require heightened levels of suspicion and increased procedural protections for accessing stored data gathered by aerial surveillance. After a legislatively determined period of time, all stored data should be deleted. 4. Legislators should enact transparency and accountability measures, requiring government agencies to publish on a regular basis information about the use of aerial surveillance devices (both manned and unmanned). 5. Legislators should recognize that technology such as geofencing and auto-redaction, may make aerial surveillance by drones more protective of privacy than human surveillance.
"Does Prison Privatization Distort Justice? Evidence on Time Served and Recidivism"
ANITA MUKHERJEE, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School
I contribute new evidence on the impact of private prisons on prisoner time served and recidivism by exploiting the staggered entry and exit of private prisons in Mississippi between 1996 and 2004. Little is known about this topic, even though burgeoning prison populations and an effort to cut costs have caused a substantial level of private contracting since the 1980s. The empirical challenge is that prison assignment may be based on traits unobservable to the researcher, such as body tattoos indicating a proclivity for violent behavior. My first result is that private prisons increase a prisoner's fraction of sentence served by an average of 4 to 7 percent, which equals 60 to 90 days; this distortion directly erodes the cost savings offered by privatization. My second result is that prisoners in private facilities are 15 percent more likely to receive an infraction (conduct violation) over the course of their sentences, revealing a key mechanism by which private prisons delay release. Conditional on receiving an infraction, prisoners in private prison receive twice as many. My final result is that there is no reduction in recidivism for prisoners in private prison despite the additional time they serve, suggesting that either the marginal returns to incarceration are low, or private prisons increase recidivism risk. These results are consistent with a model in which the private prison operator chooses whether to distort release policies, i.e., extend prisoner time served beyond the public norm, based on the typical government contract that pays a diem for each occupied bed and is imperfectly enforced.
"Insider Trading Sentencing: An Anglo-American Comparison"
 Journal of Business Law 566-586
RITA CHEUNG, Chinese University of Hong Kong
This article compares and contrasts the amended section 2B1.4 of the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the English guideline judgment for insider trading and new definitive guidelines under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This article argues that the US law with its undue emphasis on gain as a core measure of harm is overly restrictive and unnecessarily complex. The ambiguity of the statutory language and the complexity of gain calculation compound confusion and create uncertainty, resulting in unwarranted sentencing disparities. The comprehensive sentencing guideline system currently being developed in England should be studied as a model for reform. Drawing heavily on the Anglo-American comparison, the article argues that the English model, while allowing a significantly greater degree of judicial flexibility than the US scheme, is consistent with the objectives of achieving greater consistency and fairness in sentencing, and would more accurately reflect the seriousness of the offence and the harm to the public and financial markets.
"'Far from the Turbulent Space': Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent Predators"
HEATHER CUCOLO, New York Law School
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, New York Law School
For the past thirty years, the US Supreme Court's standard of Strickland v. Washington has governed the question of adequacy of counsel in criminal trials. There, in a Sixth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that simply having a lawyer assigned to a defendant was not constitutionally adequate, but that that lawyer must provide "effective assistance of counsel," effectiveness being defined, pallidly, as requiring simply that counsel's efforts be "reasonable" under the circumstances. The benchmark for judging an ineffectiveness claim is simply "whether counselâ€™s conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." This standard, however, has proven to fall far short of insuring that counsel is truly adequate: that she investigates the case, provides the defendant with all the information necessary for the defendant to make informed choices, and to mount a vigorous defense at trial.
Over a decade ago, in In re the Mental Health of K.G.F., the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the Strickland standard might not be a sufficient test of adequacy in cases involving involuntary civil commitment, relying on state statutory and constitutional sources to find that "the right to counsel...provides an individual subject to an involuntary commitment proceeding the right to effective assistance of counsel. In turn, this right affords the individual with the right to raise the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging a commitment order." In assessing what constitutes "effectiveness," the court -- startlingly, to our minds -- eschewed the Strickland standard as insufficiently protective of the "liberty interests of individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon the expiration of a ninety-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge of inferiority of a once involuntarily committed person with a proven mental disorder." Importantly, one of the key reasons why Strickland was seen as lacking was the court's conclusion that "reasonable professional assistance" -- the linchpin of the Strickland decision -- "cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts -- and even requires -- an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation."
In this paper, we turn our attention to another aspect of the justice system that does not involve a pending criminal prosecution but which may potentially lead to lengthy -- indeed, potentially lifetime -- periods of institutionalization: proceedings that follow the invocation of Sexually Violent Predator Acts (SVPA). The question that we address is this: Does, at the least, the Strickland standard apply to such cases, or should a more rigorous standard -- Ã la K.G.F. -- be employed?
Interestingly, there have been multiple cases decided on the question of whether the failure of counsel to inform a client that a guilty plea in a criminal trial might make the client eligible for SVPA proceedings. Courts have split, finding, on one hand, that -- because of, among other reasons, "the severity of [the[ consequences" of potential SVPA commitment -- this failure rose to the level of ineffectiveness of counsel, while others have rejected these claims, noting that the SVPA proceeding is merely "civil and regulatory in nature." Those cases that have found Strickland violations have mostly drawn on the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that counsel's failure to advise his client about the potential immigration/deportation consequences of a guilty plea were to be assessed by the Strickland standard, whereas those that rejected application of Strickland have, by and large, limited Padilla to the context of deportation, and thus inapplicable to SVPA commitments. Those cases that have applied Strickland, following Padilla, have generally recognized that "lack of knowledge about serious consequences undermines the basic fairness and legitimacy of a guilty plea but few cases have extended this concept to notification of the consequence of the SVPA."
We assert that Strickland -- especially given the pallid interpretations of Strickland that have passed constitutional muster in felony cases -- is an insufficient predicate for a finding of constitutionality in such proceedings and that, again, in the wake of K.G.F., a more searching standard (albeit a different one from K.G.F.) must be employed.
We say this for three main reasons: 1. SVPA proceedings normally turn on the interpretation of several controversial psychometric tests, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the bulk of lawyers doing such cases has any familiarity with these instruments and with the literature about their validity and reliability. 2. Although the Supreme Court has held in Ake v. Oklahoma that a defendant has a right to an independent expert in a felony trial, there is scant analogous case or statutory law with regard to SVPA matters. This makes it even less likely that counsel will be able to ably launch a defense in such cases. 3. There is no question that the population in question is the most despised group of individuals in the nation. Societyâ€™s general revulsion towards this population is shared by judges, jurors and lawyers. Although the bar pays lip service to the bromide that counsel is available for all, no matter how unpopular the cause, the reality is that there are few volunteers for the job of representing these individuals, and that the public's enmity has a chilling effect on the vigorous of representation in this area.
For all of these reasons, we propose a new standard for such cases: We believe that, in order to be effective at an SVPA hearing, counsel must demonstrate a familiarity with the psychometric tests regularly employed at such hearings, and with relevant expert witnesses who could assist in the representation of the client, experts who would be appointed by the court at no cost to the person facing sex offender adjudication in the same manner envisioned by the Ake Court in insanity cases. Further, we believe that the use of such a standard would also best comport with the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.
"No Stroking in the Pokey: Promulgating Penological Policies Prohibiting Masturbation Among Inmate Populations"
Journal of Law & Social Deviance, Vol. 7, p. 80, 2014
CARMEN M. CUSACK, Nova Southeastern University
In law school, â€œgunningâ€? means to participate assertively during class discussion, but, in prison, â€œgunningâ€? typically means to masturbate at the sight of a (female) guard, who is able to observe that the male inmate is masturbating. â€œGunningâ€? can more generally describe public masturbation in prison. Most U.S. prisoners are prohibited from masturbating by state and federal policies, however. Among academics and bloggers, advocacy for prisonersâ€™ rights to masturbate has become more popular in recent years. Yet, autoeroticism continues to be proscribed for inmates for important reasons, some of which are set forth in this Article. In Section II, this Article explains that prisoners have little right to privacy, and public masturbation is not socially acceptable within prison or in the general population. An important reason for maintaining this taboo is the high comorbidity between public masturbation and other paraphilic sex crimes. Thus, statesâ€™ policies support that public masturbation among inmates could negatively impact society within prison, and upon inmatesâ€™ reentry into the general population. Allowing public masturbation in prison would reduce the societal benefits of incarceration and some prisonersâ€™ rehabilitative benefits. Section III further justifies proscriptions on masturbation by arguing that frequent masturbation can adversely affect energy levels and drive. Therefore, masturbation could lower inmatesâ€™ desires to improve themselves while in prison. Though arguments and studies may postulate that masturbation can soothe, create pleasure, and alleviate boredom and frustration, inmates should use their vitality, time, and energy to learn, rehearse, and engage in more sophisticated, productive, and deeply satisfying coping skills and activities. Section IV discusses examples that link masturbation and sex abuse within prison and the general population to argue that elimination of all sexual contact in prison, including masturbation, is essential to protect inmates from such abuse. This Section explains why all sexual contact in prison should be considered to be nonconsensual. In male correction facilities, the presence of semen on a person or object ought to be considered to be evidence of a crime, especially when assault has been alleged. A defense of masturbation should not thwart the potential strength of this evidence. The statesâ€™ interest in investigating and punishing sexual assault perpetrated by inmates or guards justifies policies that eliminate consensual emissions and masturbation. In cases in which male inmates suffer from nocturnal emissions, then such occurrences should be reported to staff. If male or female prisoners cannot refrain from voluntary or involuntary masturbation, then mental health professionals should treat them. California Department of Corrections offers a model for this response.
"Obscene Performative Pornography: R V Peacock (2012) and the Legal Construction of Same-Sex and Gendered Identities in the United Kingdom."
Porn Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 2014
SARAH BERESFORD, University of Lancaster
How are the concepts of obscenity and extreme pornography â€˜producedâ€™ and by whom? The failed prosecution in R v Peacock (2012) revealed English law to be based on attempts to protect public and individual morality â€“ ensuring that people do not become â€˜depraved and corruptedâ€™ by the pornography they see and hear. The Obscene Publications Acts 1959 and 1964, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, figure criminality upon normalized notions of â€˜appropriateâ€™ pornography and â€˜appropriateâ€™ sexual expression. A Foucaultian analysis would suggest that in regulating pornography and obscenity through the lens of morality, it is the law itself that produces and creates these concepts and hence the perpetuation of ideas of â€˜acceptableâ€™ identity expression. Using Michel Foucault's ideas on â€˜truthâ€™ and â€˜knowledgeâ€™ and Judith Butler's theories of performativity, this article suggests that the decision to prosecute Peacock was, in and of itself, an act of production, creation and â€˜performativityâ€™ that contributes to the â€˜regime of truthâ€™ about pornography and obscenity.
"When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders"
DALLAN F FLAKE, Brigham Young University
This paper advocates for changes in the law to facilitate the employment of ex-offenders. One of the most pressing, yet overlooked, issues in the United States is the growing population of criminal offenders. The increase in arrest and incarceration rates over the past thirty years is historically unprecedented. Today, an estimated 65 million Americans â€” one-third of adults â€” have a criminal record. Ex-offenders are an especially vulnerable population, not only because they are disproportionately poor, uneducated, and racial minorities, but because they tend to elicit little sympathy from the general public, despite having paid their debt to society. The employment sector can be particularly inhospitable toward ex-offenders: if a criminal conviction does not automatically disqualify an ex-offender from a certain line of work, chances are an employer will refuse to hire the applicant based on stigmas and stereotypes about his or her criminal record. It is little wonder the United Statesâ€™ recidivism rate is among the highest in the world. Shut out from legitimate employment opportunities, ex-offenders may feel forced to turn to illegitimate means of survival. Subsequent criminal activity not only harms the individual offender, but can also have disastrous consequences for the offenderâ€™s family, community, and society at large.
This paper begins with an analysis of several recent studies linking criminal background, employment discrimination, and recidivism. These studies indicate that most employers do, in fact, discriminate against ex-offenders, and that the inability of ex-offenders to find employment is a major contributor to recidivism. It next examines how the law perpetuates discrimination against ex-offenders, whether through professional-licensing requirements that categorically disqualify ex-offenders, or through the near absence of restrictions on how employers utilize criminal records in making employment decisions. It then offers two recommendations for how the law can be changed to promote more fair treatment of ex-offenders in employment. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be amended to prohibit discrimination against ex-offenders unless there is a direct relationship between the criminal offense and the specific job in question, or if employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety of others. Second, in the event an ex-offender commits an offense while employed, the employer should be immune from a negligent-hiring claim upon proof it reasonably determined that employing the ex-offender would not pose undue risk to others. Together, these proposed changes in the law would help strike the appropriate balance between an ex-offenderâ€™s need to be gainfully employed and an employerâ€™s countervailing need to maintain a safe and productive workplace.
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This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts of empirical or theoretical scholarship on topics related to crime, criminal law, and criminal punishment (including the death penalty), from any disciplinary perspective. Covered topics include victims' rights, criminal sentencing rules, criminal sentencing procedures, criminal punishment, theories of criminal punishment, alternatives to traditional criminal punishment, criminal law doctrine, and administration of criminal justice.
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Law & Society: Public Law - Crime, Criminal Law, & Punishment eJournal
ALFRED C. AMAN
Roscoe C. O'Byrne Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer School of Law
Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
PETER C. CARSTENSEN
George H. Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School
KENNETH GLENN DAU-SCHMIDT
Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
LAUREN B. EDELMAN
Director, Center for the Study of Law and Society, Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley - Jurisprudence & Social Policy Program and Center for the Study of Law and Society
SALLY ENGLE MERRY
Marion Butler McLean Professor in the History of Ideas, Wellesley College - Department of Anthropology
HOWARD S. ERLANGER
Voss-Bascom Professor of Law, Professor of Sociology [Emeritus] Review Section Editor - Law & Social Inquiry, University of Wisconsin Law School
LUIS E. FUENTES-ROHWER
Professor of Law, Adjunct Professor of Latino Studies, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
MARC S. GALANTER
John & Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison
Co-Director, Center for Law, Society and Culture, Professor of History & Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer School of Law
WILLIAM D. HENDERSON
Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Editorial Advisory Board, Law and Society Review, Assistant Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Sociology
Professor of Law and Political Science, SUNY Buffalo Law School
JOYCE S. STERLING
Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law