JANA KRAJCOVA, Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)
Email: Jana.Krajcova@cerge.cuni.cz

I analyze subjects’ sensitivity to parametric change that does not affect the theoretical prediction. I find that increasing the value of an illegal transaction to a briber and reducing the penalties to both culprits leads to more bribes being paid but does not affect the cooperation of the bribee. My data also suggest that trust and preferences towards others might play a role. My paper provides a testbed for experimental testing of anti-corruption measures and adds evidence to the on-going discussion on the need for socio-demographic controls.

L. RUSH ATKINSON, New York University - School of Law
Email: lra247@nyu.edu

In its first years of operation, both the caseload and global role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have steadily increased. The Court owes much of its success to a coalition of states that has championed a strong, independent judiciary to try heinous international crimes. These states have repeatedly clashed with the United States over a number of issues involving the ICC’s jurisdiction. This article examines the pro-ICC coalition and its strategies during these disputes. It argues that the coalition’s success stems from the make-up of its membership, which endows it with varied sources of power and tempers its principled positions with an understanding of the political realities of the international order. The ICC coalition also serves as a case study of the power politics behind the formation of international law. While international law continues to be forged under the forces of realpolitik, this coalition’s success indicates that power-forged international law does not have to be the handmaiden of the most powerful states.

LARS HOFFMANN, TICOM
Email: lars.hoffmann@uvt.nl

The central argument of this paper is that the substantial treaty reforms, as agreed by the 2002/3 Convention on the Future of Europe (and later adopted by the 2004 IGC), were only achieved because the Convention process was much more successful in creating flexibility in member states’ positions than a purely intergovernmental bargaining scenario. The paper thereby contributes to the understanding of governmental behaviour in the context of EU treaty negotiations, providing a powerful argument against the realist assumption that member state governments act in solely based on their national interests. The paper starts with the proposal that during the 2002/3 Convention three specific factors had a significant impact on government positions and reform outcome: socialisation, institutional involvement and the application of the consensus rule. These three ‘Convention factors’ facilitated flexibility in the positions of the member state governments and were thus central in the Convention’s overall achievement of substantial reforms that went far beyond the 2000 Nice Treaty outcome and were subsequently confirmed by the 2003/4 and 2007 intergovernmental conferences.