Do Designated Market Makers Facilitate Earnings News Discovery? 

SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper No. 22-10

Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming

55 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2022 Last revised: 13 Nov 2025

See all articles by Neil Bhattacharya

Neil Bhattacharya

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department

Bidisha Chakrabarty

Saint Louis University - Richard A. Chaifetz School of Business

Matthew Ma

Rutgers Business School - Camden

Jing Pan

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting

Date Written: November 12, 2025

Abstract

As markets replace contractual liquidity providers (designated market makers; DMMs) with voluntary liquidity provision through cutting-edge technology, we investigate how this affects price discovery. Research suggests that endogenous liquidity provision is not always optimal. We investigate how DMMs affect the incorporation of earnings news into prices. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that increased DMM participation facilitates earnings news discovery—lower JUMP, lower Synchronicity, and higher Future Earnings Response Coefficient. Greater DMM participation associates with improved liquidity, and induces greater informed trading as evidenced by more short selling on negative news and increased EDGAR and Bloomberg search activity before earnings announcements. Our results highlight an important and hitherto overlooked effect of modern technology on processing earnings information.

JEL Classification: G02, G10, G14, M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharya, Neil and Chakrabarty, Bidisha and Ma, Matthew and Pan, Jing,

Do Designated Market Makers Facilitate Earnings News Discovery? 

(November 12, 2025). SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper No. 22-10, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4060375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4060375

Neil Bhattacharya

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department ( email )

Bidisha Chakrabarty

Saint Louis University - Richard A. Chaifetz School of Business ( email )

3674 Lindell Blvd
St. Louis, MO MO 63108-3397
United States
3149773607 (Phone)
3149771479 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://business.slu.edu/departments/finance/faculty-staff/bidisha-chakrabarty

Matthew Ma

Rutgers Business School - Camden ( email )

227 Penn Street
Camden, NJ 08102
United States

Jing Pan (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

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