Are Analyst Forecast Errors Really Kinky?

50 Pages Posted: 29 May 2024 Last revised: 3 Mar 2026

See all articles by Mary E. Barth

Mary E. Barth

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Wayne R. Landsman

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School

Junyoung Jeong

University of Texas at Dallas

Sean Wang

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department

Date Written: May 24, 2024

Abstract

The distribution of analyst forecast errors exhibits a well-known "kink"—a disproportionate frequency of small positive earnings surprises relative to small misses—widely attributed to managerial earnings management. We show that approximately 66% of this asymmetry is instead attributable to analyst strategic behavior. Analysts systematically under-revise earnings forecasts while issuing directionally consistent target price and recommendation revisions in the same report, a practice we term bundling. Using out-of-sample industry-year coefficients to remove the predictable forecast bias associated with bundling, we find the ratio of small positive to small negative forecast errors falls from 2.43 to 1.49. Bundling intensity predicts earnings surprises at both the report and firm-quarter levels, and intensifies during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty. Firms with higher analyst bundling rely less on discretionary accruals to meet or beat forecasts, suggesting analyst-induced bias and earnings management are substitutes. These findings imply that studies using meet-or-beat indicators as proxies for earnings management are partially capturing analyst strategic behavior.

Keywords: Financial Analysts, Earnings Announcements, Financial Accounting, Capital Markets, Earnings Forecasts, Analyst Forecast Error, Earnings Surprises, Target prices, Stock recommendations, Soft Information

JEL Classification: G1, G10, M41

Suggested Citation

Barth, Mary E. and Landsman, Wayne R. and Jeong, Junyoung and Wang, Sean,

Are Analyst Forecast Errors Really Kinky?

(May 24, 2024). SMU Cox School of Business Research Paper No. 24-6, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4839739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4839739

Mary E. Barth

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9040 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

Wayne R. Landsman

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-962-3221 (Phone)
919-962-4727 (Fax)

Junyoung Jeong

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

2601 North Floyd Road
Richardson, TX 75083
United States

Sean Wang (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Accounting Department ( email )

United States
2147682858 (Phone)

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