International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis

Miller, Darius P.; Lel, Ugur

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming

59 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2007

See all articles by Darius P. Miller

Darius P. Miller

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Ugur Lel

University of Georgia - Department of Banking and Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of the most stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to shed poorly performing CEOs.

Keywords: CEO turnover, cross-listing, bonding

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Miller, Darius P. and Lel, Ugur, International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis. Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=982283