Gender Differences in Wage Expectations: Sorting, Children, and Negotiation Styles

53 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2019

See all articles by Lukas Kiessling

Lukas Kiessling

Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics

Pia Pinger

University of Cologne

Philipp Seegers

Maastricht University

Jan Bergerhoff

University of Bonn

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

This paper presents evidence from a large-scale study on gender differences in expected wages before labor market entry. Based on data for over 15,000 students, we document a significant and large gender gap in wage expectations that closely resembles actual wage differences, prevails across subgroups, and along the entire distribution. To understand the underlying causes and determinants, we relate expected wages to sorting into majors, industries, and occupations, child-rearing plans, perceived and actual ability, personality, perceived discrimination, and negotiation styles. Our findings indicate that sorting and negotiation styles affect the gender gap in wage expectations much more than prospective child-related labor force interruptions. Given the importance of wage expectations for labor market decisions, household bargaining, and wage setting, our results provide an explanation for persistent gender inequalities.

Keywords: subjective wage expectations, gender gap, negotiation styles

JEL Classification: D810, D840, I210, I230, J130, J300

Suggested Citation

Kiessling, Lukas and Pinger, Pia and Seegers, Philipp and Bergerhoff, Jan, Gender Differences in Wage Expectations: Sorting, Children, and Negotiation Styles (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 7827, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3467960

Lukas Kiessling (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics ( email )

Kurt Schumacher Str 10
Bonn, DE NRW 53113
Germany

Pia Pinger

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Philipp Seegers

Maastricht University ( email )

No Address Available, Limburg

Jan Bergerhoff

University of Bonn ( email )

No Address Available

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