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Conditional Versus Contingent Fees

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 89-101, 2007

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Institute of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2007

Abstract

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients' cases. If there is asymmetric information about the expected level of adjudication, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

Keywords: JEL classifications: D82, K1

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand, Conditional Versus Contingent Fees (January 2007). Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 89-101, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1098694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpl015

Winand Emons (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Institute of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://winand-emons.ch/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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