Diffusion Dynamics in European and Latin American Democratization

Abstract

Surprisingly, the cross-national diffusion of contention over political regimes has slowed down greatly over the last 200 years. Yet at the same time, its rate of success in triggering democratic transitions has increased as clearly. What accounts for these inverse trends and the negative correlation underlying them? After refuting arguments that highlight modernization and globalization, the rise of nationalism, rational learning, and the appeal of norms and values, this paper develops a novel explanation that rests on cognitive-psychological insights and invokes secular organizational developments. In the 19th century, before political parties had arisen, it fell to common people to decide on whether to join challenges to established autocrats. Short on reliable information and political experience, these citizens relied on inferential shortcuts that induced them to follow external precedents of successful regime changes rashly; yet this very rashness, which bred challenges in unfavorable situations, led to limited success. After the rise of parties, by contrast, common people take cues from organizational leaders, who command more information and experience. Before emulating an external precedent and challenging their own rulers, leaders therefore wait for propitious circumstances. For this reason, regime contention in the 20th century diffuses more slowly yet attains higher rates of success. The paper documents these arguments by analyzing the spread of the 1848 revolutions, the impact of the Russian Revolutions of 1917, and the third wave of democratization, exemplified by Chile’s transition to democracy during the 1980s.

Keywords: diffusion, democratization, contention, bounded rationality, cognitive heuristics