Prospect Theory and Trading Patterns

Posted: 26 Jun 2010 Last revised: 16 May 2013

See all articles by Jing Yao

Jing Yao

School of Economics, Fudan University

Duan Li

Chinese University of Hong Kong; City University of Hong Kong

Date Written: February 15, 2013

Abstract

Reference dependence, loss aversion, and risk seeking for losses together comprise the preference-based component of prospect theory that sets its value function apart from the standard risk-aversion model. Using an elasticity analysis, we show that this distinctive preference component serves to underpin negative-feedback trading propensities, but cannot manifest itself in behavior directly or holistically at the individual-choice level. We then propose and demonstrate that the market interaction between prospect-theory investors and regular CRRA investors allows this preference component to dominate in equilibrium behavior and hence helps to reestablish the intuitive link between prospect-theory preferences and negative-feedback trading patterns. In the model, the interaction also reconciles the contrarian behavior of prospect-theory investors with asymmetric volatility and short-term return reversal. The results suggest that prospect-theory preferences can lead investors to behave endogenously as contrarian noise traders in the market interaction process.

Keywords: prospect theory, negative-feedback trading, price elasticity of demand, contrarian behavior, the disposition effect, noise trading

JEL Classification: D03, D81, G11, G12

Suggested Citation

Yao, Jing and Li, Duan and Li, Duan, Prospect Theory and Trading Patterns (February 15, 2013). Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37, No. 8, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1629766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1629766

Jing Yao (Contact Author)

School of Economics, Fudan University ( email )

600 Guoquan Road
Shanghai, Shanghai 200433
China

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.fudan.edu.cn/yaojing/

Duan Li

Chinese University of Hong Kong ( email )

Shatin, New Territories
Hong Kong

City University of Hong Kong

Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon Tong
Kowloon
Hong Kong
852 3442 8591 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
2,195
PlumX Metrics