Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action

45 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2011 Last revised: 27 Jun 2026

See all articles by Georgiy V. Bobashev

Georgiy V. Bobashev

RTI International

Maureen Cropper

- Department of Economics; Resources for the Future

Joshua M. Epstein

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Medicine

D. Michael Goedecke

RTI International

Stephen Hutton

World Bank

Mead Over

Center for Global Development

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2011

Abstract

This paper examines positive externalities and complementarities in the use of antiviral pharmaceuticals to mitigate pandemic influenza. The paper demonstrates the presence of treatment externalities in simple epidemiological SIR models, and then through simulations of a Global Epidemiological Model, in which the pandemic spreads between cities through the international airline network, and between cities and rural areas through ground transport. While most treatment benefits are private, spillovers may mean that it is in the self-interest of rich countries to pay for some AV treatment in poor countries. The most cost-effective policy is for rich countries to donate doses to the outbreak source country; however, donating doses to poor countries in proportion to their populations may also be cost-effective. These results depend on the transmissibility of the flu strain, the efficacy of antivirals in reducing transmissibility and on the proportion of infectious that can be identified and treated.

Suggested Citation

Bobashev, Georgiy V. and Cropper, Maureen L. and Epstein, Joshua M. and Goedecke, D. Michael and Hutton, Stephen and Over, Mead, Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action (July 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17195, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1882163

Georgiy V. Bobashev (Contact Author)

RTI International ( email )

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Maureen L. Cropper

- Department of Economics ( email )

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Resources for the Future ( email )

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Joshua M. Epstein

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Medicine ( email )

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D. Michael Goedecke

RTI International ( email )

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Stephen Hutton

World Bank ( email )

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Mead Over

Center for Global Development ( email )

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Washington, DC 20036
United States

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