Ideology, Objectivity, and Reality in Natural Science, Social Science, and Politics

Abstract

Addresses the problem of whether an objective, realistic social science is possible or whether any social science is bound to remain merely a form of ideology-that is of systematically false, distorted belief. Formulates some ways of thinking about an autonomous social reality that can serve as objective constraint on theorizing and as court of appeal for hypothesis testing, while taking into account various objections that have been leveled against the ideal of a realistic, objective social science_-such as those referring to the mechanistic bias of mainstream social science, the openness of social systems, the plasticity of social reality, the contribution of meaning to social reality, the inevitable biases of theoretical and conceptual perspective and the social construction of reality. Most objections to the ideal of an "objective" social science affect only a particular conception of objectivity, i.e. the "objectivity" of the Newtonian model. What is thought to be the Scientific Method--a philosophically-neutral, empirically content-free method of inquiry actually imports into social science an unrecognized ontology. This ontology is prejudice as what the social world is like. Confused with objectivity it becomes an important source of deformed representation of reality in mainstream social science. A conception of objectivity and sociological realism is advanced that is detached from this Newtonian ideology. It is not pretended that ideological deformation can be rooted out of either science or politics, but that it can be better brought under control if its sources are better understood.

Keywords: Newtonian model, mechanism, scientific social science, objectivity, meaning, interpretation