Sequential or Simultaneous Elections? A Welfare Analysis
39 Pages Posted: 12 May 2012 Last revised: 24 May 2023
Date Written: May 2012
Abstract
This paper addresses a key question on the design of electoral systems. Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered, with late voters observing early returns before making their decisions? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on the preferences and information of early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Under simultaneous elections, voters equally weigh the available information but place too much weight on their priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Given these trade-offs, simultaneous elections are welfare-preferred if the front-runner initially has a small advantage, but sequential elections are welfare-preferred if the front-runner initially has a large advantage. We then quantitatively evaluate this trade-off using data based on the 2004 presidential primary. The results suggest that simultaneous systems outperform sequential systems although the difference in welfare is relatively small.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Information Cascades: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Financial Market Professionals
By Jonathan E. Alevy, Michael S. Haigh, ...
-
Information Cascades: Evidence from an Experiment with Financial Market Professionals
By Jonathan E. Alevy, Michael S. Haigh, ...
-
Observational Learning: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Field Experiment
By Hongbin Cai, Yuyu Chen, ...
-
Social Learning and Peer Effects in Consumption: Evidence from Movie Sales
-
Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries
By Brian G. Knight and Nathan Schiff
-
Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations
-
Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations
-
Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. The Laboratory
By Gary Charness, Ernan Haruvy, ...
-
Are Longer Cascades More Stable?
By Dorothea Kübler and Georg Weizsacker
-
Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals
By Antonio Guarino and Marco Cipriani