The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis: Why Financial Markets Do Not Work Well in the Real World

41 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2012 Last revised: 15 Jun 2025

See all articles by Roger E. A. Farmer

Roger E. A. Farmer

University of Warwick; University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)

Carine Nourry

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)

Alain Venditti

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2012

Abstract

Existing literature continues to be unable to offer a convincing explanation for the volatility of the stochastic discount factor in real world data. Our work provides such an explanation. We do not rely on frictions, market in completeness or transactions costs of any kind. Instead, we modify a simple stochastic representative agent model by allowing for birth and death and by allowing for heterogeneity in agents' discount factors. We show that these two minor and realistic changes to the timeless Arrow-Debreu paradigm are sufficient to invalidate the implication that competitive financial markets efficiently allocate risk. Our work demonstrates that financial markets, by their very nature, cannot be Pareto efficient except by chance. Although individuals in our model are rational; markets are not.

Suggested Citation

Farmer, Roger E.A. and Nourry, Carine and Venditti, Alain, The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis: Why Financial Markets Do Not Work Well in the Real World (December 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w18647, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2192820

Roger E.A. Farmer (Contact Author)

University of Warwick ( email )

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Carine Nourry

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

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Alain Venditti

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) ( email )

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Paris, 75006
France

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM) ( email )

Centre de la Vieille Charité
2, rue de la Charité
Marseille, 13002
France

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