Power or Persuasion: Unilateral Orders and the Legislative Process

Abstract

Unilateral orders are one of the president’s most formidable administrative tools yet surprisingly when they are used in the legislative process, Congress rarely responds. This research seeks to explore this black box of executive-legislative relations by analyzing two types of unilateral orders, executive orders and policy proclamations, to identify when they are used as part of a legislative strategy and their effect on the legislative process. In the universe of unilateral orders, presidents use them as a legislative strategy to influence the direction and enactment of legislation. Congress is more likely to respond with support when they are used to influence the introduction of legislation even when the objective is to move policy closer to the president. However after bills are on the agenda, Congress is more likely to constrain the president when he uses unilateral orders to move policy closer to him. This is the first empirical study of the relationship between the strategic use of unilateral orders as a legislative strategy and their effect on Congress. Importantly, this research shows how these two branches of government use their institutional tools at hand to shape policy along a legislative continuum.

Keywords: unilateral orders, president, Congress