The Future of Agricultural Cooperatives

Posted: 11 Oct 2013

See all articles by Murray Fulton

Murray Fulton

University of Saskatchewan - Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy

Konstantinos Giannakas

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources - Department of Agricultural Economics

Date Written: June 2013

Abstract

Cooperatives are of particular interest to economists because of their unique ownership structure and the incentives this structure creates. In addition to the so-called property rights problems (e.g., free-rider, horizon, and portfolio problems), the analysis of agricultural cooperatives has focused on issues of market power, agency, product quality, and increasingly producer and consumer heterogeneity. These last three elements are important features of the industrialization of the agrifood system. This article highlights the key concepts required for examination of cooperatives now and in the future and incorporates these concepts into a framework that can be used to examine the myriad situations and problem settings in which agricultural cooperatives are likely to be found. A key finding of the paper is that the procompetitive and distributional impacts of cooperatives depend critically on the sensitivity of price in the downstream retail market, the nature of the cooperative’s governance structure, and the open or closed nature of cooperative membership. The article also provides a discussion of new areas in which an understanding of cooperatives and collective action would be valuable, as well as a discussion of the applicability of the proposed framework to these areas.

Suggested Citation

Fulton, Murray and Giannakas, Konstantinos, The Future of Agricultural Cooperatives (June 2013). Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 61-91, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2339090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151928

Murray Fulton (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan - Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy ( email )

101 Diefenbaker Place
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5B8
Canada
(306) 966-8507 (Phone)
(306) 966-8517 (Fax)

Konstantinos Giannakas

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources - Department of Agricultural Economics ( email )

216 FYH
Lincoln, NE
United States
402-472-2041 (Phone)

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