Non-Practicing Entities: Enforcement Specialists?

35 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2014 Last revised: 26 Jun 2019

See all articles by Axel Haus

Axel Haus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Steffen Juranek

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Business and Management Science

Date Written: August 1, 2017

Abstract

We examine whether non-practicing entities (NPEs) have a superior ability to pursue patent lawsuits. We develop a theoretical model that predicts that cases with superior abled patentees resolve faster than cases with opponents of equal ability. Our empirical analysis of a sample of US patent litigation cases shows this duration pattern for NPE cases. The result is robust to controlling for patent and court characteristics but also for an important feature of NPE cases, a lack of product market interaction with the potential infringers. Finally, we observe, in line with our theory, a similar duration pattern for large firm patentees; firms with access to a similar legal expertise.

Keywords: non-practicing entities, litigation, patents, market for patents

JEL Classification: K0, K41, O34

Suggested Citation

Haus, Axel and Juranek, Steffen, Non-Practicing Entities: Enforcement Specialists? (August 1, 2017). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 53, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2424407 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2424407

Axel Haus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Grueneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.mm.uni-frankfurt.de/index.php?id=1522?&L=1

Steffen Juranek (Contact Author)

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Business and Management Science ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

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