Bring in the Friendly Hand: The Effects of Judicial Inaction on Democratic Policymaking in Immigration Law

Abstract

Many scholars have theorized that judicial review can provide a “friendly hand” to the elected branches by enforcing legislative bargains, taking on politically difficult decisions, clarifying vague or conflicting legislation, and/or buttressing federal power against state actors. Other scholars contend that empowering the judiciary to have an active role in policymaking has undesirable consequences – to these scholars, the judicialization of politics unwisely reframes the policy debate in legal terms, disempowers social movements by removing issues from traditional political contestation, and generates public and political backlash. This paper addresses these claims by examining an area where the courts, through either actively declining jurisdiction or passively acquiescing to executive power, have deliberately abstained from claiming a role in policymaking. We examine the negative space caused by such willful “un-juridification” by looking at American immigration policy.