Download This PaperQuantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria
International Game Theory Review, Forthcoming
17 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2014 Last revised: 19 Jun 2019
Date Written: July 8, 2018
Abstract
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average over all adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.
Keywords: First-mover advantage, second-mover advantage, partial commitment
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Weber, Thomas A., Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria (July 8, 2018). International Game Theory Review, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2512882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512882
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