Conceptualizing Cyber Deterrence by Entanglement

Abstract

Conventional models of deterrence focus on the ability to deter adversaries through ex-ante threats that impose ex-post costs or through the elevation of ex-ante costs through strategies that deny. The imposition of costs on adversaries in cyberspace is extremely complex and the establishment deterrence by threat or denial is constrained by problems associated with resource asymmetries, attribution, and a diverse set of actors with overlapping capabilities. Due to these challenges, conventional models of deterrence have seen limited success in cyberspace. Rather than building more robust defenses or threatening retaliatory actions technical entanglement within cyberspace offers an alternative approach that might affect the decision-matrix of adversary states. This paper examines the concept of technical entanglement as a way of altering how states conceptualize offensive actions cyberspace and works towards building mutual inter-dependencies to make actions that disrupt, degrade or deny within cyberspace undesirable.

Keywords: Cyber, Deterrence, Entanglement, National Security, Peace, War