Intelligence Demands in a Democratic State: Congressional Intelligence Oversight

Abstract

The recent revelations regarding a domestic surveillance program exposed an exceptionally divisive issue: to what extent can the Executive conduct intelligence operations absent congressional oversight? This Article seeks to address this question through an examination of the historical and constitutional foundations for congressional intelligence oversight. Despite a strong historical and constitutional basis for demanding a significant role for Congress in the conduct of intelligence operations, the nature and breadth of this role remain unclear. Intuitively, one sees Congress’s role in guaranteeing the conduct of intelligence operations in accordance with majoritarian views on mores, civil liberties, and human rights. Less intuitive is Congress’s role in facilitating efficient and aggressive intelligence operations. For a multitude of reasons, Congress has often failed to accomplish either function. The instant historical period finds the Intelligence Community under increased congressional scrutiny. This presents a unique opportunity for Congress to reassert itself and fulfill its constitutional mandate. To this end, the Article provides appropriate recommendations.

Keywords: Intelligence, Intelligence Oversight, CIA, Church Committee, NSA, Patriot Act, FISA, Title III, 12333, Watergate, Surveillance, Supreme Court, Law, National Security Act, Iran-Contra, Yellow Fruit, Goldwater-Nichols, DNI, SSCI, HPSCI

JEL Classification: N4, N40