An Interest Rate Commission Agent Banking System

28 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2015 Last revised: 5 Jan 2016

See all articles by Ameha Tefera Tessema

Ameha Tefera Tessema

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia

Jan Walters Kruger

University of South Africa (UNISA) - Graduate School of Business Leadership (SBL)

Date Written: August 19, 2015

Abstract

The financial crises emanating from bank run, bad debt, asset-liability mismatch, excessive leverage, sovereign default that result in bank failure have not been solved. In order to solve these problems, banks adopted several models even though each banking business model was a catalyst for financial crisis. However, these problems can be solved by applying an interest rate commission agent banking system (AIRCABS), which is a system where the bank is an agent for investors’ loan funding to entrepreneurs by setting up an agreement between the fund seller, and buyer and administering the loan after disbursement. The bank then retains a reasonable commission from the agreed investor’s loan funding contract. As interest rates increase, the demand for funding loan to entrepreneur through AIRCABS also increases.

Keywords: financial crises, bank run, investor loan funding, discrete interest rate, interest rate commission agent banking, liquidity problem, banking model

JEL Classification: E22, E40, E50, G01, G33

Suggested Citation

Tessema, Ameha Tefera and Kruger, Jan Walters, An Interest Rate Commission Agent Banking System (August 19, 2015). 28th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2647609 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2647609

Ameha Tefera Tessema (Contact Author)

Commercial Bank of Ethiopia ( email )

Addis Ababa
Addis Ababa, 20412
Ethiopia

Jan Walters Kruger

University of South Africa (UNISA) - Graduate School of Business Leadership (SBL) ( email )

Smutsweg
Midrand, 1686
South Africa

HOME PAGE: http://za.linkedin.com/pub/prof-jan-kruger/10/368/677/

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