Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy

13 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2016 Last revised: 15 Jun 2025

See all articles by Edward L. Glaeser

Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrew Hillis

Harvard University

Scott Duke Kominers

Harvard University; a16z crypto

Michael Luca

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Date Written: March 2016

Abstract

Can open tournaments improve the quality of city services? The proliferation of big data makes it possible to use predictive analytics to better target services like hygiene inspections, but city governments rarely have the in-house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms. Cities could hire consultants, but a cheaper alternative is to crowdsource competence by making data public and offering a reward for the best algorithm. This paper provides a simple model suggesting that open tournaments dominate consulting contracts when cities have a reasonable tolerance for risk and when there is enough labor with low opportunity costs of time. We also illustrate how tournaments can be successful, by reporting on a Boston-based restaurant hygiene prediction tournament that we helped coordinate. The Boston tournament yielded algorithms—at low cost—that proved reasonably accurate when tested “out-of-sample” on hygiene inspections occurring after the algorithms were submitted. We draw upon our experience in working with Boston to provide practical suggestions for governments and other organizations seeking to run prediction tournaments in the future.

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L. and Hillis, Andrew and Kominers, Scott Duke and Luca, Michael, Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy (March 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22124, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755416

Edward L. Glaeser (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Room 315A
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2150 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Andrew Hillis

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Scott Duke Kominers

Harvard University ( email )

Rock Center
Harvard Business School
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.scottkom.com/

a16z crypto ( email )

Michael Luca

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=602417

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
1,022
Rank
860,052
PlumX Metrics