The Contract of Employment and the Paradoxes of Precarity

23 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2016

See all articles by Mark R. Freedland

Mark R. Freedland

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

Date Written: June 13, 2016

Abstract

In recent decades, and with increasing acceleration in the last ten years, the law and practice of the contract of employment in the United Kingdom have been dissolving themselves from a state in which a stable contract of employment represented the essential norm into a complex of precarious types of employment relation. This descent into precarity presents us with several legal and practical paradoxes. Perhaps the deepest of these is the emergence into a centrally prominent position of the so-called ‘zero-hours contract’ - a paradoxical development in the sense that, in many of its forms, this kind of employment relation should not be regarded as an employment contract at all. Another one consists of the abolition of mandatory retirement age in the name of control of age discrimination; ostensibly increasing the security of employment of the older worker, this measure, it will be argued, in fact makes employment more precarious than ever, effectively undermining the notion of ‘permanent employment’. This paper examines the legal bases, but also the profound social and economic consequences, of these ironical developments.

Keywords: Contract of employment, paradoxes of precarity, precarious employment relations, zero-hours contract, abolition of mandatory retirement age

JEL Classification: K31

Suggested Citation

Freedland, Mark R., The Contract of Employment and the Paradoxes of Precarity (June 13, 2016). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 37/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2794877 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2794877

Mark R. Freedland (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

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