Disguised Collective Action in China

Abstract

How does civil society mobilize citizens in an authoritarian state that forbids organizations from coordinating collective contention? Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in underground labor organizations in China, this article theorizes a tactical innovation — disguised collective action — that lowers the cost of organizing contention under repression. Instead of forming organizations to facilitate collective action, organizations enable citizens to better contend as individuals. Departing from processes captured by the “dynamics of contention” framework, organizations act as unconventional mobilizing structures by coaching aggrieved citizens to make individual rights claims without engaging in perilous collective protests. Through a hidden pedagogical process, claimants are coached to deploy a repertoire of atomized actions that targets the bureaucratic mandate to maintain social stability and also appeals to officials’ moral authority. When effective, disguised collective action can secure concessions for participants while allowing activists to strike a middle ground between challenging authorities and organizational survival.

Keywords: authoritarian politics, contentious politics, mobilization, civil society, China, labor