Charter Schools and Labor Market Outcomes

78 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2016 Last revised: 27 Dec 2025

See all articles by Will Dobbie

Will Dobbie

Princeton University

Roland G. Fryer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); American Bar Foundation; University of Chicago

Date Written: August 2016

Abstract

We estimate the impact of charter schools on early-life labor market outcomes using administrative data from Texas. We find that, at the mean, charter schools have no impact on test scores and a negative impact on earnings. No Excuses charter schools increase test scores and four-year college enrollment, but have a small and statistically insignificant impact on earnings, while other types of charter schools decrease test scores, four-year college enrollment, and earnings. Moving to school-level estimates, we find that charter schools that decrease test scores also tend to decrease earnings, while charter schools that increase test scores have no discernible impact on earnings. In contrast, high school graduation effects are predictive of earnings effects throughout the distribution of school quality. The paper concludes with a speculative discussion of what might explain our set of facts.

Suggested Citation

Dobbie, Will and Fryer, Roland G., Charter Schools and Labor Market Outcomes (August 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22502, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2823310

Will Dobbie (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

Roland G. Fryer

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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