A Strategic Court and National Security: Comparative Lessons from the Israeli Case

Israel Studies Forum, Volume 25, Issue 2, p. 54–80 DOI/0.3167/isf.2010.250203, Fall 2010

27 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2017

See all articles by Udi Sommer

Udi Sommer

Columbia University - Department of Political Science; Tel Aviv University

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This article analyzes decision making in national security cases on the Israeli Supreme Court and draws broader comparative conclusions. In the post-9/11 era, security has topped the national agendas in numerous established democracies, with repercussions involving their courts. Analyses of decision making on national security in Western judiciaries may benefit from lessons from the Israeli Court, which has been a pivotal player in this domain. A formal model analyzes how internal court institutions plus the rationality of individual justices are conducive to strategic Court behavior. Predictions are tested empirically using an original database with security decisions from 1997 to 2004. The findings indicate that constitutional design, Court leadership, ideology of the ruling coalition and interest group activity have influenced decisions of the Israeli Court on national defense. This study builds on and expands existing scholarship on the complex links among law, politics, and national security in Israel and beyond.

Keywords: National Security; Judicial Institutions; Israeli Supreme Court; 9/11

Suggested Citation

Sommer, Udi, A Strategic Court and National Security: Comparative Lessons from the Israeli Case (2010). Israel Studies Forum, Volume 25, Issue 2, p. 54–80 DOI/0.3167/isf.2010.250203, Fall 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2895020

Udi Sommer (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

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420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

Tel Aviv University ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv
Tel Aviv, Israel 62486
Israel
9176226009 (Phone)

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