Download This PaperOptimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
66 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2017
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Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run-Risk
Date Written: September 2017
Abstract
We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset portfolio and capital structure interact to support credit extension, as well as to provide liquidity and risk-sharing services to the real economy. Our modifications create wedges in the asset and liability mix between the private equilibrium and a social planner’s equilibrium. Correcting these distortions requires the joint implementation of a capital and a liquidity regulation.
Keywords: Bank Runs, Credit Risk, Limited Liability, Regulation, Capital, Liquidity
JEL Classification: E44, G01, G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Anil K. Kashyap (Contact Author)
University of Chicago, Booth School of Business ( email )
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United States
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Dimitrios P. Tsomocos
University of Oxford - Said Business School and St. Edmund Hall ( email )
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Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
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Alexandros Vardoulakis
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )
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Washington, DC 20551
United States