Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection and the EU/US Transatlantic Rift

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 7(1), 27-53

29 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2017 Last revised: 9 Oct 2020

See all articles by Filippo Lancieri

Filippo Lancieri

Georgetown University Law Center; ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics; Stigler Center

Date Written: May 10, 2018

Abstract

EU authorities increasingly take antitrust and data protection enforcement action against US internet companies. While many believe in digital protectionism, this paper looks at the foundations of data protection and antitrust policies across the Atlantic to propose an alternative explanation based on the distinct views over how online markets work and should be regulated. Europeans associate data protection with inalienable rights, Americans treat data as an asset. Europeans use competition policy to advance personal freedom, US antitrust policy focuses on economic efficiency. These singular EU traits encourage the regulation of major internet companies. While the European mistrust of data amassing by private parties supplies political motivation to rein in on digital giants, its competition law framework provides a toolkit capable of overcoming challenges commonly present whenever regulators take antitrust enforcement action against Big Data firms. The US does not share either. This indicates that the EU/US divide over internet regulation will grow - and transatlantic tensions perilously increase. The paper concludes by arguing for an adjusted role for economic reasoning in antitrust enforcement as a way to bridge differences.

Keywords: Antitrust, Privacy Protection, Big Data, Online Markets, European Union, United States

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L40, L50

Suggested Citation

Lancieri, Filippo, Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection and the EU/US Transatlantic Rift (May 10, 2018). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 7(1), 27-53 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075204

Filippo Lancieri (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

ETH Zurich Center For Law and Economics ( email )

ETH-Zentrum SEW E 26
CH-8092 Zurich, Zurich 8006
Switzerland

Stigler Center ( email )

Walker Hall
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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