Financing Ventures

72 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2017 Last revised: 3 Mar 2022

See all articles by Juan M. Sánchez

Juan M. Sánchez

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Pengfei Han

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Jeremy Greenwood

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August, 2017

Abstract

The relationship between venture capital and growth is examined using an endogenous growth model incorporating dynamic contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. At each stage of financing, venture capitalists evaluate the viability of startups. If viable, venture capitalists provide funding for the next stage. The success of a project depends on the amount of funding. The model is confronted with stylized facts about venture capital: statistics by funding round concerning success rates, failure rates, investment rates, equity shares, and IPO values. The increased efficiency offered by venture capital for financing inventive startups is important for long-run growth and welfare.

Keywords: capital gains taxation, dynamic contracts, endogenous growth, evaluating, financial development, funding rounds, IPO, monitoring, startups, research and development, venture capital

JEL Classification: E13, E22, G24, L26, O16, O31, O40

Suggested Citation

Sanchez, Juan M. and Sanchez, Juan M. and Han, Pengfei and Greenwood, Jeremy, Financing Ventures (August, 2017). FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2017-35, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078555 or http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2017.035

Juan M. Sanchez (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Pengfei Han

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

Jeremy Greenwood

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-1505 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://jeremygreenwood.net

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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