Inferring the Ideological Affiliations of Political Committees Via Financial Contributions Networks

85 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2017 Last revised: 8 Jun 2025

See all articles by Yiran Chen

Yiran Chen

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Hanming Fang

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2017

Abstract

About two thirds of the political committees registered with the Federal Election Commission do not self identify their party affiliations. In this paper we propose and implement a novel Bayesian approach to infer about the ideological affiliations of political committees based on the network of the financial contributions among them. In Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that our estimation algorithm achieves very high accuracy in recovering their latent ideological affiliations when the pairwise difference in ideology groups' connection patterns satisfy a condition known as the Chernoff-Hellinger divergence criterion. We illustrate our approach using the campaign finance record in 2003-2004 election cycle. Using the posterior mode to categorize the ideological affiliations of the political committees, our estimates match the self reported ideology for 94.36% of those committees who self-reported to be Democratic and 89.49% of those committees who self reported to be Republican.

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yiran and Fang, Hanming, Inferring the Ideological Affiliations of Political Committees Via Financial Contributions Networks (December 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w24130, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3089526

Yiran Chen (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

Hanming Fang

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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