Asset Redeployability and the Choice between Bank Debt and Public Debt

59 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2018 Last revised: 18 Jun 2020

See all articles by Haosi Chen

Haosi Chen

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU)

David A. Maslar

University of Tennessee, Knoxville - Department of Finance; University of Tennessee, Knoxville - College of Business Administration

Matthew Serfling

University of Tennessee; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: June 17, 2020

Abstract

A firm with less redeployable assets, which are assets that have fewer alternative uses outside the firm, is more likely to borrow from banks than issue public debt. These findings are consistent with firms with less redeployable assets valuing the ability to renegotiate bank debt contracts instead of selling assets in the event of default. Consistent with this mechanism, firms with lower asset redeployability sell fewer assets following covenant violations. Our results contribute to work on the determinants of which debt markets a firm chooses to borrow from and the role that banks play as intermediaries.

Keywords: Asset Redeployability, Debt Structure, Bank Debt, Public Debt, Debt Issuance

JEL Classification: D92, G32, G33

Suggested Citation

Chen, Haosi and Maslar, David A. and Serfling, Matthew, Asset Redeployability and the Choice between Bank Debt and Public Debt (June 17, 2020). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3104096

Haosi Chen

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) ( email )

111 Renai Road, SIP
, Lake Science and Education Innovation District
Suzhou, JiangSu province 215123
China

David A. Maslar

University of Tennessee, Knoxville - Department of Finance ( email )

Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

University of Tennessee, Knoxville - College of Business Administration ( email )

453 Haslam Business Building
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States

Matthew Serfling (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee ( email )

Haslam College of Business
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-1952 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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