247 Jurisdictions in the World Get the Good-Faith Purchase Problem Wrong: A New Economic Framework

European Property Law Journal 9(2–3), 133–156, 2019

2023. Property Law: Comparative, Empirical, and Economic Analyses. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 19-25

59 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2018 Last revised: 30 Aug 2023

Date Written: June 23, 2019

Abstract

Scholars have argued that reasonable persons can disagree on what the most sensible good-faith purchase doctrine is. Indeed, using hand-coded data on this doctrine in 247 jurisdictions, this article finds that this doctrine has hardly converged —— at least 23 different variants of this doctrine, from “no good faith required” to “good faith is all the purchaser needs,” are implemented. This article, however, argues against an agnostic position about which rule maximizes allocative and productive efficiency jointly. More specifically, the market overt rule is closest to productive efficiency, as original owners, merchant dealers, and consumers have incentives to spend close to optimal costs on verification and prevention. When both an original owner and a consumer are non-negligent, an internal auction between them, both assigned 50% ownership by the court, can tease out who values the resource more.

Keywords: market overt rule, stolen goods, embezzled chattels, allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, mechanism design, Myerson and Satterwaite Impossibility Theorem

JEL Classification: K11

Suggested Citation

Chang, Yun-chien, 247 Jurisdictions in the World Get the Good-Faith Purchase Problem Wrong: A New Economic Framework (June 23, 2019). European Property Law Journal 9(2–3), 133–156, 2019, 2023. Property Law: Comparative, Empirical, and Economic Analyses. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. , NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 19-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3208458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3208458

Yun-Chien Chang (Contact Author)

Cornell Law School ( email )

310 Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
247
Abstract Views
1,695
Rank
308,710
PlumX Metrics