Do Anti-Bribery Laws Reduce the Cost of Equity? Evidence From the UK Bribery Act 2010

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 47, Issue 3-4, pp. 438-455, 2020

33 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2018 Last revised: 14 Jul 2020

See all articles by Suhee Kim

Suhee Kim

University of Edinburgh Business School

Bill Rees

University of Edinburgh - Accounting and Finance

Vathunyoo Sila

University of Edinburgh - Business School

Date Written: May 1, 2020

Abstract

We examine the impact of the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 on the implied cost of equity. We find a significant reduction in the cost of equity amongst U.K. firms with high bribery exposure. We further show that the Bribery Act improves internal control system and increases stock liquidity of firms with high bribery exposure. Our results suggest that more stringent anti-bribery regulations are not always bad for the firm.

Keywords: bribery, anti-bribery law, cost of equity, residual income valuation, internal control, stock liquidity, information asymmetry

JEL Classification: G30, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Kim, Suhee and Rees, William and Sila, Vathunyoo, Do Anti-Bribery Laws Reduce the Cost of Equity? Evidence From the UK Bribery Act 2010 (May 1, 2020). Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 47, Issue 3-4, pp. 438-455, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3221984

Suhee Kim (Contact Author)

University of Edinburgh Business School ( email )

Edinburgh
United Kingdom
+447845903086 (Phone)

William Rees

University of Edinburgh - Accounting and Finance ( email )

29 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh, EH8 9JS
United Kingdom
+44 131 651 5244 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk

Vathunyoo Sila

University of Edinburgh - Business School ( email )

29 Buccleuch Place
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JS
United Kingdom
+447428747109 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.business-school.ed.ac.uk/staff/ben-sila

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