Download This PaperCyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets
33 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2019 Last revised: 10 May 2019
Date Written: March 1, 2019
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new cycle criterion, Cyclical Conflicts (CCs), for preference profiles in two-sided matching markets through a dynamic mechanism. We first show that CCs provide a complete characterization of singleton cores in two-sided matching markets. Secondly, we prove the existence of a bijection between the CCs structures and the lattice structures of stable matchings.
Keywords: Cyclical Conflicts, Singleton Cores, Lattice Structure, Two-Sided Matching Markets
JEL Classification: C78, D47
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Evci, Bora, Cyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets (March 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344803 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3344803
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN