Antitrust Über Alles. Whither Competition Law After Facebook?

World Competition, volume 42, issue Issue 3, 2019[10.54648/woco2019020]

18 Pages Posted: 24 May 2019 Last revised: 8 Feb 2025

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

Università degli Studi della Basilicata; Stanford Law School; International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)

Mariateresa Maggiolino

Bocconi University - Department of Law; Ask Research Center

Date Written: March 29, 2019

Abstract

After a three-year investigation the German Competition Authority found Facebook’s data policy abusive. In the authority’s assessment, by making the use of its social-networking service conditional upon users granting extensive permission to collect and process their personal data, Facebook unlawfully exploited its dominant position in the German market for social networks. Hence, the GCA has found a way – its way, quite German-specific – to limit Facebook’s ability to gather, combine, and analyze data. In order to achieve this goal, it has acted as a self-appointed enforcer of data protection rules, ascertaining a violation not detected by any data protection authority before and casting a ‘special privacy responsibility’ upon dominant firms.

Keywords: Antitrust; Privacy; Big Data; Facebook; Bundeskartellamt

JEL Classification: D83; K21; L12; L4

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe and Maggiolino, Mariateresa, Antitrust Über Alles. Whither Competition Law After Facebook? (March 29, 2019). World Competition, volume 42, issue Issue 3, 2019[10.54648/woco2019020], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3362428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2019020

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi della Basilicata ( email )

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Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

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Mariateresa Maggiolino

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

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Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Ask Research Center ( email )

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Milan, 20136
Italy

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