Justice In-Between: The Decision-Theoretic Case for Many-Valued Criminal Verdicts

Abstract

The article compares the binary and the many-valued models of the verdict system. The binary model – by far the most popular in contemporary Western criminal jurisdictions – is characterised by a single standard of proof. If the standard is met, the verdict is ‘guilty’ and the consequence of punishment ensues; if the standard is not met, the verdict is ‘not-guilty’ and no punishment is meted out. The many-valued model, instead, involves at least two standards of proof, each accompanied by a distinct verdict. An additional verdict is reserved for the case in which the lowest standard is not satisfied. Each verdict may be coupled with a sanction, the severity of which increases with the probability of guilt corresponding to the verdict. The article contributes to the justification of the many-valued model. Relying on decision theory, it shows that this model is superior to the binary model. The article focuses, in particular, on a many-valued system with a single intermediate option between acquittal and conviction, and it identifies concrete intermediate options that would warrant the superiority of this system over our current binary system.

Keywords: criminal verdicts, verdict system, many-valued model, decision theory, standard of proof, criminal justice