Managing the Risk of Corruption in Customs through Single Window Systems

Abstract

Corruption has hampered the efficiency of customs administrations in many developing countries. However, the problem has taken on a new dimension in the 21st century following the rise in international terrorism. Criminal corruption at border points, where criminal operators offer bribes to customs officials to allow them to smuggle arms and other illegal substances, has posed a great risk to both the internal and international security of many countries. This paper examines how single window systems can be used as a tool to combat customs corruption. It analyses the various facets of customs corruption and discusses its impact on the affected countries. The paper then takes an economic approach to understanding the root cause of customs corruption by following Klitgaard’s 1988 analytical framework which states that corruption flourishes in situations where agents have monopoly power over clients, where agents have great discretion, and where accountability of agents to the principal is weak. The paper concludes by evaluating how single window systems can be used to combat customs corruption. It outlines several case studies including the Philippine Bureau of Customs, Georgia Customs and Qatar Customs where the automation of customs processes was credited with reducing corruption in the bureaus. The discussions in this paper aim to show how single window systems can be used as a tool to eliminate customs corruption which has far-reaching consequences.