World Trade Organization Law and Resource Justice

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the WTO legal compatibility of two policies: a direct boycott on the trade of “authoritarian natural resources” and blacklisting of vessels that transport these natural resources.I provide an overview of the legal arguments supporting the view that both the authoritarian oil boycott and the blacklisting policy would be found WTO-compatible. In the first section, I examine the compatibility of the authoritarian resource boycott under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1994). I determine, following Bartels (2012), that the authoritarian resource boycott will most likely survive WTO Panel scrutiny. In the next section, I examine the vessel blacklisting policy under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS 1995). I find that, given the unique status of the regulatory framework governing maritime transport, the policy is most probably WTO compatible. I also provide reasons to suggest that, for the majority of WTO members, the blacklisting policy will not even be subject to WTO Panel scrutiny under the GATS. I conclude that all the policies offered in the previous chapter would be deemed, in all likelihood, WTO compatible. In the final section, I consider the possibility of a waiver from WTO obligations.

Keywords: Popular Resource Sovereignty, natural resources, WTO law, Kimberley process