Do Internal Control Weaknesses and Their Related Adverse Outcomes Impact Municipal Debt Costs?

Posted: 7 Jun 2019

See all articles by Christopher T. Edmonds

Christopher T. Edmonds

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Ryan Leece

University of Alabama at Birmingham

Beth Y. Vermeer

University of Delaware - Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics

Date Written: April 5, 2019

Abstract

This study investigates whether municipal bond prices reflect weaknesses in internal control and their related adverse outcomes (i.e., compliance with laws and regulations and questioned costs). Using hand-collected data from 866 official registration statements, our results suggest that adverse outcomes play an important role in explaining the underlying relationship between weaknesses in internal control and initial bond yields. Specifically, the municipal bond market penalizes governments with solely adverse outcomes, with a greater penalty if an adverse outcome is accompanied by a material weakness in internal control. Overall, our results provide compelling evidence that investors value the disclosure of internal control weaknesses/adverse outcomes in the Federal Audit Clearinghouse and that these disclosures have significant public policy implications.

Keywords: internal control weaknesses, material noncompliance with laws and regulations, questioned costs, municipal bonds

Suggested Citation

Edmonds, Christopher T. and Leece, Ryan and Vermeer, Beth Y., Do Internal Control Weaknesses and Their Related Adverse Outcomes Impact Municipal Debt Costs? (April 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391465

Christopher T. Edmonds

University of Alabama at Birmingham ( email )

Birmingham, AL 35294-4460
United States

Ryan Leece

University of Alabama at Birmingham ( email )

Birmingham, AL 35294-4460
United States

Beth Y. Vermeer (Contact Author)

University of Delaware - Alfred Lerner College of Business and Economics ( email )

419 Purnell Hall
Newark, DE 19716
United States

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