On the Impact of Trade in a Common Property Renewable Resource Oligopoly

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-021

29 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2019

See all articles by Hassan Benchekroun

Hassan Benchekroun

McGill University - Department of Economics

Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

University of Winnipeg - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Dina Tasneem

American University of Sharjah - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 29, 2019

Abstract

We consider a common-pool renewable resource differential game. We show that within this dynamic oligopolistic framework, free trade may lead to a lower discounted sum of consumer surplus and of social welfare than autarky. Trade restrictions may be supported based on both resource conservation and efficiency motives. A priori, this finding is not straightforward; a move from Autarky to Free Trade causes industry output to first increase and then decrease over time. While producers are shown to be always worse off under free trade than under autarky, consumers are better off in the short run and worse off in the long run. We determine the conditions under which the long-run effects outweigh the short-run effects of trade, leading to a decrease in the discounted sum of not only consumer surplus, but also social welfare.

Keywords: renewable resources, international trade, fisheries, commom property

JEL Classification: F10, Q20, Q22, Q27

Suggested Citation

Benchekroun, Hassan and Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita and Tasneem, Dina, On the Impact of Trade in a Common Property Renewable Resource Oligopoly (May 29, 2019). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3395724

Hassan Benchekroun (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
Canada

Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

University of Winnipeg - Department of Economics ( email )

Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9
Canada

Tilburg University - Tilburg University School of Economics and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Dina Tasneem

American University of Sharjah - Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 26666
Sharjah
United Arab Emirates

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