Economic Development and Environmental Enforcement for Local Governments in China

Abstract

Amidst rapid economic growth, many Chinese people have expressed a growing concern over environmental degradation. The Chinese central government has enacted a wide array of environmental laws and regulations, but they often fail to produce the desired results because of a lack of effective enforcement by local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs). A critical question arises: what factors affect the functioning of local EPBs? A sizeable literature identifies major factors that affect local environmental enforcement in China, however, they often focus on specific environmental initiatives in single locations. This article analyses data relating to administrative penalty decisions for environmental violation made by 31 local EPBs at the provincial level. It finds that the Gross Regional Product (GRP)-orientated performance evaluation system, together with China’s decentralised environmental governance structure, results in growing diversity among the Chinese provinces in how they deal with local environmental challenges. In brief, the richer Eastern provinces are more concerned with environmental enforcement, while the economically backward Central and Western areas still tend to prioritise economic growth at the expense of environmental enforcement. This article further argues that instead of the traditional Gross Domestic Product (GDP), China needs to develop a Green GDP to enhance local authorities’ interest in environmental enforcement.