Correlativity and Its Logic: Asymmetry not Equality in the Law

Abstract

This article provides a scheme of intelligibility for correlativity, recognising its importance for analytical and normative aspects of legal relations. It considers a variety of types of normative correlativity, investigates the logic of correlativity, and distinguishes three forms of correlation involving legal rights. It undertakes careful re-examination of Aristotelian texts to reveal neglected or misrepresented insights, restores certain Hohfeldian distinctions, and argues for a more complicated relationship between correlativity and reciprocity than previously acknowledged. Specific sections employ the scheme to provide critiques of Weinrib’s use of correlativity in his understanding of private law as corrective justice, and Zylberman’s amalgam of reciprocal correlativity in his non-instrumental view of human rights. A brief concluding section notes the deep asymmetry of law and suggests an understanding of corrective justice based on asymmetry rather than equality. More speculatively, it raises doubts about the core conviction of Kantian thinking on legal and social relationships.