Evidence for the Effect of Monitoring Costs on Foreign Direct Investment

54 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2019 Last revised: 11 May 2026

See all articles by Bruce A. Blonigen

Bruce A. Blonigen

University of Oregon - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Anca D. Cristea

University of Oregon - Department of Economics

Donghyun Lee

University of Mary Washington

Date Written: June 2019

Abstract

A proposed reason for the significant inverse relationship between distance (both physical and cultural) and foreign direct investment is the increased costs for a parent firm to monitor an affiliate when there is greater distance between them. We provide the first direct test of this hypothesis using O*NET data on occupational skills to construct industry-level measures of the importance of monitoring-related skills. We then exploit this cross-industry variation to examine whether physical and cultural distances have a greater impact on cross-border M&A in industries where monitoring-related skills are more important. Using data on worldwide cross-border M&A activity from 1985 through 2014, we find significant evidence for the effect of monitoring costs on cross-border M&A activity. We also show that the relatively low importance of monitoring-related costs in manufacturing industries compared to those in other sectors is an important factor in explaining why cross-border M&A in manufacturing is so large despite its relatively small share of the modern economy.

Suggested Citation

Blonigen, Bruce A. and Cristea, Anca D. and Lee, Donghyun, Evidence for the Effect of Monitoring Costs on Foreign Direct Investment (June 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w25933, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401639

Bruce A. Blonigen (Contact Author)

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

1285 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
541-346-4680 (Phone)
541-346-1243 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Anca D. Cristea

University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )

1245 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403
United States

Donghyun Lee

University of Mary Washington ( email )

1301 College Avenue
Fredericksburg, VA 22401
United States

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