To What Extent, If at All, Is It Desirable or Realistic to Aim for a Global Agreement on Competition Policy?

19 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2019

Date Written: May 6, 2019

Abstract

The pursuit of a globally recognised competition policy appears to be endless at this point in time. Lack of cohesion among global institutions and an inability to forego certain differences to achieve a suitable global policy are just some of the reasons examined in this brief essay on why such a global competition is an unrealistic expectation currently.

This essay examines 3 institutions that formulate global competition policy, the World Trade Organisation, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Competition Network. While these powerful policymakers have made efforts to try and achieve as coherent a policy as possible, their inevitable shortcomings and disadvantages as forums for discussing and implementing internationally recognised competition policy is well examined. The relative infancy of competition law in many developing countries has also led to a situation where these developing countries implement a competition policy based on the needs and specific interests of developed countries. This practice is clearly counter-intuitive but is a practice that is widespread and almost impossible to reverse. This essay also analyses the costs of implementing a global agreement on competition policy, the obstacles such an agreement would actually create and the general difficulty states have encountered when trying to reach such an agreement.

Keywords: competition policy, WTO, agreement, OECD

JEL Classification: K30

Suggested Citation

Kretzmer, Tevia, To What Extent, If at All, Is It Desirable or Realistic to Aim for a Global Agreement on Competition Policy? (May 6, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404131 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3404131

Tevia Kretzmer (Contact Author)

University of Kent ( email )

United Kingdom
07956586034 (Phone)
2192 (Fax)

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