Download This PaperIncentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities
10 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2019 Last revised: 11 Sep 2019
Date Written: September 10, 2019
Abstract
We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Marriage Market, Externalities, Incentives, Implementation
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D62, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée and Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria, Incentives and Implementation in Marriage Markets with Externalities (September 10, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405698 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3405698
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