Environmental Regulation and Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from South Korea

39 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2019

See all articles by Sunghoon Chung

Sunghoon Chung

World Bank - Development Research Group; Korea Development Institute (KDI)

Date Written: January 1, 2014

Abstract

This paper studies how environmental regulation shapes the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI), and thereby assesses the pollution haven hypothesis. Conflicting results exist in the case studies examining the most advanced countries, partly due to the deterrent effect of clean technology adoptions on industry migration. To minimize the clean technology effect, we examine the pattern of South Korean FDI over 2000–2007, the period that Korean firms relied on old production technologies despite facing rapidly strengthened environmental standards. A difference-in-differences type identification strategy circumvents other potential confounders. We find strong evidence that polluting industries tend to invest more in countries with laxer environmental regulations in terms of both the amount of investment (intensive margin) and the number of new foreign affiliates (extensive margin). A similar finding is obtained when imports are analyzed.

Keywords: Pollution Haven Hypothesis, Environmental Regulation, Comparative Advantage, Foreign Direct Investment, South Korea

JEL Classification: F18, F23, O44, Q56

Suggested Citation

Chung, Sunghoon, Environmental Regulation and Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from South Korea (January 1, 2014). Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 108, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3409630 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3409630

Sunghoon Chung (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group ( email )

Washington, DC 20433
United States

Korea Development Institute (KDI) ( email )

263 Namsejong-ro
Sejong-si 30149
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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