Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares
43 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2003 Last revised: 17 Nov 2022
Date Written: February 2003
Abstract
This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the date, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Goetzmann, William N. and Ukhov, Andrey and Spiegel, Matthew I., Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (February 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9469, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=375321
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