Metering Problems and Resource Allocation

67 Pages Posted: 28 May 2021 Last revised: 26 Feb 2026

See all articles by Ionela Andreicovici

Ionela Andreicovici

IE Business School - IE University

Laurence van Lent

Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Valeri V. Nikolaev

University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Ruishen Zhang

The University of Hong Kong

Date Written: August 25, 2023

Abstract

Why do seemingly similar firms show such different productivity? We argue that unresolved measurement problems, i.e., the persistent incongruity between economic transactions and their accounting representation, affect resource allocation. Our metric quantifies technical accounting terminology in firm disclosures to capture these unresolved measurement problems, U M P , using over 90,000 10-Ks. A one-standard-deviation increase in U M P is associated with lower capital investment (6%), R&D (5%), and hiring growth (30%). We also find a reduction in total factor productivity (5%) and Tobin's Q (4%). Further, CEO compensation sensitivity to accounting performance decreases with U M P , while stock-based sensitivity remains unaffected. Our inferences continue to hold when we use a Bartik instrument, which exploits differential exposure to GAAP changes to isolate accounting-driven variation from the firm's underlying economics. The results suggest unresolved measurement problems are a significant friction in resource allocation. We make our U M P dataset publicly available.

Keywords: measurement, information frictions, productivity, investment, CEO compensation contracts JEL codes: D22

JEL Classification: D22, D23, D24, G12, J23, M40

Suggested Citation

Andreicovici, Ionela and van Lent, Laurence and Nikolaev, Valeri V. and Zhang, Ruishen, Metering Problems and Resource Allocation (August 25, 2023). TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 30, HKU Jockey Club Enterprise Sustainability Global Research Institute - Archive, Forthcoming in The Accounting Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3853951 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853951

Ionela Andreicovici

IE Business School - IE University ( email )

Calle Maria de Molina 12
Madrid, Madrid 28006
Spain

Laurence Van Lent (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance and Management ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.laurencevanlent.org

Valeri V. Nikolaev

University of Chicago Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/valeri.nikolaev/index.html

Ruishen Zhang

The University of Hong Kong ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Pokfulam HK
China

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