Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality, Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar. Springer Japan, Tokyo (2017). xv+189 pp., €114.39, ISBN: 978-4-431-55395-3.

Abstract

The book consists of three essays on Oligopoly, Auctions, and Market Quality, an introduction to the concepts used and a survey the author’s contributions to the literature that integrates the concept of market quality into theoretical models of auctions and oligopoly. Dastidar follows Yano’s (2009, 2010) definition of market quality. “High-quality markets are indispensable for the healthy growth and development of modern economies;” and “The development of properly designed market infrastructure, such as rules and laws, is indispensable to ensuring the high quality of the market”(p.16). High market quality entails quality of competition, information, and products. Quality of competition implies there are no coercive sales, which means there can be no market power due, for example, to restrictions to entry by corruption and poor governance. Quality of information means there is no fraud. Quality of products entails the absence of shoddy merchandise or inferior execution of public projects due, for example, to corruption or incompetence. Full paper available at http://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.08.002